Suchergebnisse

Southeast Asia is a laboratory showing current worldwide ecological issues. Environmental change, natural resource exploitation as well as global climate change increasingly threaten people's livelihoods. Environmentally-based uncertainties foster a high level of knowledge uncertainty. This poses a constantly growing threat to agricultural production. Vulnerable communities with a low degree of resilience are most severely affected. But local communities have abilities to innovate and develop locally embedded coping strategies. The contributors of this volume are most interested in environment

Southeast Asia is a laboratory showing current worldwide ecological issues. Environmental change, natural resource exploitation as well as global climate change increasingly threaten people's livelihoods. Environmentally-based uncertainties foster a high level of knowledge uncertainty. This poses a constantly growing threat to agricultural production. Vulnerable communities with a low degree of resilience are most severely affected.But local communities have abilities to innovate and develop locally embedded coping strategies. The contributors of this volume are most interested in environmental change that fosters knowledge uncertainties. Regions discussed include the Mekong Delta in Vietnam, Moluccas, Central Kalimantan, West Sumatra and South Sulawesi in Indonesia and Tangail Region in Bangladesh.

On 31 December 1985, Singapore left the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), turning against the 'New International Information Order' demanded by UNESCO at that time. In October 2007, after 22 years of absence, Singapore rejoined UNESCO, looking for an intensification of cultural and scientific exchange. Taking this example of reviving co-operation between Singapore and UNESCO, this paper assesses the concept of 'creative industries' as a boundary concept that allows for increased co-operation between players with generally opposing knowledge concepts — as manifested in their respective knowledge and cultural politics. The paper starts with a conceptual discussion on the crossing of boundaries. This is followed by an assessment of first, UNESCO's and second, Singapore's gradual repositioning towards culture. While UNESCO turned from distinctly separating 'culture' and 'market' in the 1970s and 1980s to an increased openness for profit-oriented conceptualisations of culture today, Singapore identified the economic potential of culture, creativity and the arts, and therefore the need to foster these as part of its development into a knowledge-based economy. The underlying differences in interests and the orientation of content, expressed by the traditionally opposing conceptualisations of knowledge and culture, are still valid today, yet the concept of 'creative industries', adopted by both sides, seems to offer a common meeting ground. It acts clearly as a bridge, and hence a boundary concept, allowing for an intensification of mutual co-operation. This is discussed in the final part of the paper.

At a time of knowledge becoming increasingly relevant to social and economic development, governments worldwide aim at the creation of country-specific types of k-society, i.e. 'information societies', 'knowledge societies' or 'knowledge-based economies'. This book redraws the processes of constructing k-societies in Germany and Singapore and offers an empirically based definition of k-society which has been missing until now. Based on the conducted research, I argue that k-societies are created by collective actors in society and are not - as often assumed - merely the result or logical consequence of the technological developments in the information and communication sector, the growth of the service industry and the high profit margin of knowledge intensive goods. I empirically focus on the activities of the state as collective actor who massively pursues the creation of k-societies in Germany and Singapore. The remaining subsystems engaged in the construction process - economy, scientific community, civil society and the media – are merely assessed with regard to their influence on state activities. The process of constructing k-societies can be divided into (a) the development of the theoretical, categorically defined concepts of k-society; (b) the construction of a vision of self-emerging k-societies; and (c) the creation of country-specific k-societies as stages of social and economic development. At the beginning of the construction process stands the development of the idea of k-society by the international scientific community. Multiple, categorically-defined concepts of k-society as well as a manifold terminology were developed. The interchangeable use of terms to label the many k-society definitions nevertheless resulted in a rather blurry picture of k-society. Accelerated by the common assumption of the rise of k-societies, this created a fertile ground for the construction of a vision of a self-emerging k-society. This thesis outlines the role of the German and Singaporean governments in creating and utilising this vision. Most political programs which aim at the creation of a k-society as a stage of development justify their existence by pointing to the apparent rise of a k-society that should be monitored. Yet in actual terms, it is these programs that call the envisioned k-society into existence. Consequently, these government programs inherently (re-)define country-specific k-societies. By assessing these procedural definitions of k-society, this thesis offers clarity to what k-societies actually are: they are what they are defined as by the actors creating them. Theoretically this is based on Berger and Luckmann's theory of the social construction of reality (1984), defining knowledge, as what is regarded as knowledge by society. Germany and Singapore, the countries of investigation, share the commonality of being modern and aiming at developing into k-societies. At the same time, the structural realities of both countries differ markedly which is precondition to the analysis. The wide differences make it possible to show that (a) k-societies are not only created as political idea and stage of development but furthermore (b) the definitions of k-society and the paths taken to create them, highly depend on the structural realities and dominant definitions of knowledge in each country. Consequently, there is not one k-society, but multiple, country-specific k-societies. Nevertheless, the data also illustrate that k-societies do not only vary in different countries but that k-society as construct was in both countries in the beginning clearly an economic and technological programme. But over time, it became more and acts in Germany and even more in Singapore today as economic and technological programme, as well as a new focal point of collective identity offered by the state in order to reduce felt insecurities. As such, the suggested concept of multiple k-societies has to be interpreted within Eisenstadt's concept of multiple modernities, which leads me to answer the initial question, what k-society actually is by stating: k-society is to the second modernity, the time of multiple modernities what 'industrial society' was for the first, western modernity. K-society is a theoretical concept created by academics and scientists. K-society is a vision that legitimises and accelerates action towards its own realisation. K-society is a stage of development in which knowledge forms the center for social, cultural, economic and technologic development. K-society is a new focal point of identity in the second modernity. And finally, k-society is a social construction of reality that will shape our future to come. Empirically, this thesis is based on (a) qualitative expert interviews conducted in Germany and Singapore; (b) a quantitative analysis of the participation of subsystems in commissions and boards of directors; (c) a quantitative analysis of the k-society terminology; as well as (d) a qualitative analysis of government programs, action plans and final reports of government commissions contributing to the construction of k-societies.

Different concepts of knowledge and the ways they are valued have influence on the politics of research and development, information, arts, and culture in various countries. In a time when knowledge increasingly gains importance for economic and social development, these concepts of knowledge, as they are defined within society, are receiving greater attention. State governments worldwide aim for the creation of 'knowledge societies'. At the core of these knowledge-based futures lie particular understandings of knowledge in each country, which determine what kinds of knowledge society are constructed. This paper attempts to grasp the dominant concepts of knowledge in Germany and Singapore as reflected in state activities and budgeting. The data suggest that the dominant concepts of knowledge in both countries differed widely in the past, which was in great part due to the structural realities in each country. Yet in recent times, with the common goals of economic growth and the exposure to global competition, these concepts of knowledge seem to increasingly converge. Adapted from the source document.

In different countries, dominant definitions of knowledge and information prevail and structure politics, especially in the fields of research and development (R&D), education, arts and culture, and the media. In 1962, for example, Machlup described the country-specific understanding of knowledge in the United States by pointing to the 'idiosyncrasy in favour of the immediately practical and against the general theoretical' (1962: 202). Lane, in 1966, picked this up and concluded: 'The United States has been slow to recognise the importance of scientific knowledge'. Although, in some ways, science grows out of technology, it is often the other way around; even in technology the United States in the 19th Century tended to lag behind Europe' (1966: 652). The arena of who defines, which knowledge and information is produced, disseminated and stored, varies in each country. Yet, the level of pluralism or singularism in defining knowledge is generally related to the degree of democratic or authoritarian rule exercised by each country's government and enabled by its political system. Furthermore, the definition of knowledge is strongly influenced by the structural realities, i.e. political system, historical experiences, economic situation etc. in each country. Consequently, country-specific definitions of knowledge exist, each of which being a unique result of the structural realities and power interplay in the specific country. In order to shed further light on these hypotheses, this paper focuses on the definitions of knowledge and information prevalent in Germany and Singapore. I ask (a) which types of knowledge and information, together with their production and dissemination, are regarded as valuable and worthy of support and (b) in what way are these definitions of knowledge influenced by the structural realities of those countries. Due to a change in focus regarding the definitions of knowledge in both countries, the former highly differing knowledge definitions have recently become increasingly similar. This leads me to the third question underlying this paper (c): Do the dominant definitions of knowledge in Germany and Singapore converge and is this at all possible with regard to the countries' wide structural differences? The assessment is based on the state fundings for R&D, education and cultural activities (museums, libraries, etc.), as well as statements of interview partners.

In the beginning of the 1990s, Singapore's government identified the local production of global knowledge as field of action that shall assure sustainable future economic and social development. This focus appears plausible when looking at the factors of production that - besides knowledge - Singapore can offer. As a small country with less than 4m inhabitants, little land and labour is available. Consequently, the Singaporean government decided to focus on knowledge and money as the factors of production that are increasingly regarded as responsible for the creation of wealth by members of the international scientific community. Besides others, the management guru Peter F. Drucker expressed this belief in the economic strength of knowledge by stating: 'the central wealth-creating activities will be neither the allocation of capital to productive uses, not 'labour'. Value is now created by 'productivity' and 'innovation' both applications of knowledge to work' (Drucker, 1994: 8). This paper attempts to outline this push towards knowledge production and the positioning of Singapore as a knowledge hub in the Straits of Malacca initiated by the Singaporean government. The paper is divided into, first, grasping the dominant definitions of knowledge in Singapore and second, redrawing the government activities towards increased knowledge production, which is hoped to ensure long-term economic stability and growth.

In the past decades, terms such as knowledge-based economy (KBE)', and 'information/knowledge society' have been adopted by governments worldwide in order to underline their interest in developing their economies and societies further and assure future growth. Many governments used these catchwords as labels for government programs and action plans aiming at economic and social prosperity. This aim of national governments to construct knowledge-based economies, information/knowledge societies, the actions taken and especially the ability or disability to do so, is the topic of this paper. As two cases of comparison act Singapore and Germany. (DIPF/Orig.)